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Abstract:  We show that the common practice of converting 1-day volatility estimates to h-
day estimates by scaling by   is inappropriate and produces overestimates of the variability
of long-horizon volatility.  We conclude that volatility models are best tailored to tasks:  if
interest centers on long-horizon volatility, then a long-horizon volatility model should be
used.  Economic considerations, however, confound even that prescription and point to
important directions for future research.
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 Chew (1994) provides insightful early discussion. 
1
 A leading example is Bankers Trust’s RAROC system; see Falloon (1995).
2
 See, for example, Smithson and Minton (1996a, b) and J.P. Morgan (1996).
3
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1.  Motivation and Background
What is the relevant horizon for risk management?  This obvious question has no
obvious answer.   Horizons such as 7 to 10 days for equity and foreign exchange, and longer
1
horizons such as 30 days for interest rate instruments, are routinely discussed.  In fact,
horizons as long as a year are not uncommon.   Operationally, risk is often assessed at a 1-day
2
horizon, and shorter (intra day) horizons have even been discussed.  Short-horizon risk
measures are converted to other horizons, such as 10-day or 30-day, by scaling.   For
3
example, to obtain a 10-day volatility we multiply the 1-day volatility by  .  Moreover, the
horizon conversion is often significantly longer than 10 days.  Many banks, for example, link
trading volatility measurement to internal capital allocation and risk-adjusted performance
measurement schemes, which rely on annual volatility estimates.  The temptation is to scale 1-
day volatility by  .
The routine and uncritical use of scaling is also widely accepted by regulators.  For
example, the Basle Committee's January 1996 "Amendment to the Capital Accord to
Incorporate Market Risks" features it prominently.  Specifically, the amendment requires a
10-day holding period and advises conversion by scaling:
In calculating value at risk, an instantaneous price shock equivalent to a 10 day
movement in prices is to be used, i.e. the minimum "holding period" will be ten
trading days.  Banks may use value-at-risk numbers calculated according to
shorter holding periods scaled up to ten days by the square root of time ...
(p. 44, section B.4, paragraph c)vt vt 1 t t
iid
(0, 2).
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In this paper we sound an alarm:  such scaling is inappropriate and misleading.  We
show in section 2 that converting volatilities by scaling is statistically appropriate only under
strict conditions that are routinely violated by high-frequency (e.g., 1-day) asset returns.  In
section 3, we provide a detailed illustrative example of the failure of scaling.  We conclude in
section 4, in which we note that, even in the unlikely event that the conditions for its statistical
legitimacy are met, scaling is nevertheless problematic for economic reasons associated with
fluctuations in portfolio composition .
2.  The Links Between Short-Horizon and Long-Horizon Risk:  Statistical
Considerations
Scaling Works in iid Environments but Fails Otherwise
Here we describe the restrictive environment in which scaling is appropriate.
Let   be a log price at time t, and suppose that changes in the log price are independently and
identically distributed, 
Then the 1-day return is
with standard deviation  .  Similarly, the h-day return is
with variance   and standard deviation  .  Hence the "  rule":  to convert a 1-day















applications, a percentile of the distribution of h-day returns may be desired; percentiles also
scale by   if log changes are iid, and in addition, normally distributed.
The scaling rule relies on 1-day returns being iid.  The literature on mean reversion in
stock returns appreciates this, and scaling is often used as a test for whether returns are iid,
ranging from early work (e.g., Cootner, 1964) to recent work (e.g., Campbell, Lo and
MacKinlay, 1996).  But high-frequency financial asset returns are distinctly not iid.  Even if
high-frequency portfolio returns are conditional-mean independent (which has been the
subject of intense debate in the efficient markets literature), they are certainly not conditional-
variance independent, as evidenced by hundreds of recent papers documenting strong
volatility persistence in financial asset returns.
4
The Failure of Scaling in non-iid Environments
To highlight the failure of scaling in non-iid environments and the nature of the
associated erroneous long-horizon volatility estimates, we will use a simple GARCH(1,1)
process for 1-day returns,
t = 1, ..., T.  We impose the usual regularity and covariance stationarity conditions,  ,
,  , and  .  The key feature of the GARCH(1,1) process is that it allows for

















 Again, see the surveys of GARCH models in finance by Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner
5
(1992) and Diebold and Lopez (1995).
 More precisely, they define and study the temporal aggregation of weak GARCH
6
processes, a formal definition of which is beyond the scope of this paper.  Although the
distinction is not crucial for our purposes, technically inclined readers should read "weak
GARCH" whenever they encounter the word "GARCH."
 Note the new and more cumbersome, but necessary, notation, the subscript in which
7
keeps track of the aggregation level.   
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has been fit to hundreds of financial series and has been tremendously successful empirically;
hence its popularity.   We hasten to add, however, that our general thesis -- that scaling fails
5
in the non-iid environments associated with high-frequency asset returns -- does not depend
on any way on a GARCH(1,1) structure.  Rather, we focus on the GARCH(1,1) case because
it has been studied the most intensely, yielding a wealth of results that enable us to illustrate
the failure of scaling both analytically and by simulation.
Drost and Nijman (1993) study the temporal aggregation of GARCH processes.  
6
Suppose we begin with a sample path of a 1-day return series,  , which follows the
GARCH(1,1) process above.   Then Drost and Nijman show that, under regularity conditions,
7
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 Bollerslev (1986) shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
8
a finite fourth moment, and hence a finite kurtosis, is  . 
 The Drost-Nijman result coheres with the result of Diebold (1988), who shows that
9
temporal aggregation produces returns that approach an unconditional normal distribution,
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and   is the solution of the quadratic equation,
where
and   is the kurtosis of  .   The Drost-Nijman formula is neither pretty nor intuitive, but it is
8
important, because it is the key to correct conversion of 1-day volatility to h-day volatility.  It
is painfully obvious, moreover, that the scaling formula does not look at all like the Drost-
Nijman formula.
If, however, the scaling formula were an accurate approximation to the Drost-Nijman
formula, it would still be very useful because of its simplicity and intuitive appeal. 
Unfortunately, such is not the case.  As  , analysis of the Drost-Nijman formula reveals
that   and  , which is to say that temporal aggregation produces gradual







which implies that volatility fluctuations must vanish.
 We set   at its unconditional mean.
10
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3.  A Detailed Example
  Let us examine the failure of scaling in a specific example.  We parameterize the
GARCH(1,1) process to be realistic for daily returns by setting  =0.10 and  =0.85, which are
typical of the parameter values obtained for estimated GARCH(1,1) processes.  Choice of   is
arbitrary and amounts to a normalization, or choice of scale.  We set  =1, which implies that
the unconditional variance of the process equals 20.  We set  , discard the first
1,000 realizations to allow the effects of the initial condition to dissipate, and keep the
following T=9,000 realizations.  In Figure 1 we show the series of daily returns and the
corresponding series of 1-day conditional standard deviations,  .  The daily volatility
fluctuations are evident.
Now we examine 10-day and 90-volatilities, corresponding to h=10 and h=90.  In
Figure 2 we show 10-day volatilities computed in two different ways.  We obtain the first
(incorrect) 10-day volatility by scaling the 1-day volatility,   , by  .  We obtain the
second (correct) 10-day volatility by applying the Drost-Nijman formula.   In Figure 3, we
10
repeat the comparison of Figure 2, except we display 90-day rather than 10-day volatilities.
It is clear that although scaling produces volatilities that are correct on average, it
magnifies the volatility fluctuations, whereas they should in fact be damped.  That is, scaling
produces erroneous conclusions of large fluctuations in the conditional variance of long-
horizon returns, when in fact the opposite is true.  Moreover, we cannot claim that the scaled10
 A moment’s reflection reveals misspecification to be the compelling case.  The
11
modern approach is to acknowledge misspecification from the outset, as for example in the
influential paper of Nelson and Foster (1994). 
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volatility estimates are “conservative” in any sense; rather, they are sometimes too high and
sometimes too low.
If scaling is inappropriate, then what is appropriate?  First, as we have shown, if the
short-horizon return model is correctly specified as a GARCH(1,1) process, then long-horizon
volatilities can be computed using the Drost-Nijman formula.
Second, if the short-horizon return model is correctly specified but does not fall into
the family of models covered by Drost and Nijman, then the Drost-Nijman results do not
apply, and there are no known analytic methods for computing h-day volatilities from 1-day
volatilities.  If we had analytic formulae, we could apply them, but we don’t.  Hence if h-day
volatilities are of interest, it makes sense to use an h-day model.
Third, when the 1-day return model is not correctly specified, things are even
trickier.   For example, the best approximation to 10-day return volatility dynamics may be
11
very different from what one gets by applying the Drost-Nijman formula to an (incorrect)
estimated GARCH(1,1) model for 1-day return volatility dynamics (and of course very
different as well from what one gets by scaling estimates of daily return volatilities by  ). 
This again suggests that if h-day volatilities are of interest, it makes sense to use an h-day
model. 
4.  Concluding Remarks
The relevant horizon may vary by asset class (e.g., equity vs. fixed income), industry
(e.g., banking vs. insurance), position in the firm (e.g., trading desk vs. CFO), and motivation Moreover, Christoffersen and Diebold (1997) show that the predictable volatility
12
dynamics in many asset returns vanish quickly with horizon, indicating that scaling can
quickly lead one astray.
 See Findley (1983) and Diebold (1998) for discussion of this same point in the
13
context of more traditional forecasting problems.
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(e.g., private vs. regulatory), and thought must be given to the relevant horizon on an
application-by-application basis.  Modeling volatility only at one short horizon, followed by
scaling to convert to longer horizons, is likely to be inappropriate and misleading, because
temporal aggregation should reduce volatility fluctuations, whereas scaling amplifies them.  
12
Instead, a strong case can be made for using different models at different horizons.
13
We hasten to add that it is not our intent to condemn scaling always and everywhere. 
Scaling is charmingly simple, and it is appropriate under certain conditions.  Moreover, even
when those conditions are violated, scaling produces results that are correct on average, as we
showed.  Hence scaling has its place, and its widespread use as a tool for approximate horizon
conversion is understandable.  But as our sophistication increases, the flaws with such “first-
generation” rules of thumb become more pronounced, and directions for improvement
become apparent.  Our intent is to stimulate such improvement.
We believe that the use of different models for different horizons is an important step
in the right direction.  But even with that sophisticated strategy, the nagging and routinely-
neglected problem of portfolio fluctuations, pinpointed in a prescient article by Kupiec and
O’Brien (1995), remains.  Measuring the volatility of trading results depends not only on the
volatility of the relevant market prices but also on the position vector that describes the
portfolio.  Estimates of h-day volatility are predicated on the assumption of a fixed position-9-
vector throughout the h-day horizon, which is unlikely.
Positions tend to change frequently in the course of normal trading, both within and
across days, for a number of reasons.  First, positions may be taken in order to facilitate a
customer transaction, and then decline to normal “inventory” levels when offsetting customer
orders come in, or when the positions are laid-off in the market or hedged.  Second, traders
may put on or take off short-term speculative positions, or adjust long-term proprietary
trading strategies.  Finally, trading management may intervene to reduce positions in response
to adverse market movements.
Whatever the cause of fluctuations in the position vector, it conflicts with the h-day
buy-and-hold assumption.  The degree to which this assumption is violated will depend on the
trading desk’s business strategy, the instruments it trades, and the liquidity of the markets in
which it trades.  For example, even one day may be too long a horizon over which to assume
a constant portfolio for a market maker in a major European currency -- the end-of-day
portfolio will bear little relation to the variety of positions that could be taken over the course
of the next day, much less the next 10 days.  To understand the risk over a longer horizon, we
need not only robust statistical models for the underlying market price volatility, but also
robust behavioral models for changes in trading positions.
Finally, we stress the challenges associated with aggregating risks across positions and
trading desks when the risks are assessed at different horizons.  Obviously, one can’t simply
add together risk measures at different horizons.  Instead, conversion to a common horizon
must be done through a combination of statistically appropriate h-day models of price
volatility and behavioral models for changes in traders’ positions.  That, in our view, is a-10-
pressing direction for future research.-11-
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90-Day Volatility, Scaled and Actual